• Corpus ID: 13605322

The Once and Future Onion

  title={The Once and Future Onion},
  author={U. S. Naval},
Onionsites are Internet sites accessed via protocols offering security protections beyond those provided by the usual protocols and infrastructure of the Internet, such as confidentiality of address lookup, and that significantly strengthen commonly offered protections; for example, their self-authenticating addresses preclude the kinds of certificate hijacks that have occurred against registered domain names. I will sketch the properties and design of onion services, including early history as… 



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