The Olson ratio and indirectly endogenous rent

@article{Fabella1996TheOR,
  title={The Olson ratio and indirectly endogenous rent},
  author={Raul Villasenor Fabella},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={1996},
  volume={89},
  pages={325-337}
}
  • R. Fabella
  • Published 1 December 1996
  • Economics
  • Public Choice
We consider an economy where the rent value depends indirectly on value-adding investment of agents (thus indirectly endogenous) and the win-probability is a function of rent seeking spending. We introduce the Olson ratio, characterize it at symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a perfectly discriminating contest and relate it to the Tullock dissipation rate. We investigate the possibility of black holes. 
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