The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses

@article{Stemmer1981TheOC,
  title={The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses},
  author={Nathan Stemmer},
  journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  year={1981},
  volume={11},
  pages={395 - 404}
}
  • N. Stemmer
  • Published 1 August 1981
  • Philosophy
  • Canadian Journal of Philosophy
According to Nicod's criterion of confirmation ([7]), a hypothesis of the form ‘All P are Q’ is confirmed by its positive instances, i.e. by entities that are P and Q. It is well known, however, that the criterion gives origin to counterintuitive results. For example, it sanctions the confirmation of ‘All nonblacks are nonravens’ by a nonblack nonraven. Since this hypothesis is logically equivalent to ‘All ravens are black,’ it follows that the criterion indirectly sanctions the… 

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TLDR
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