The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-savage argument for Bayesian theory

  title={The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-savage argument for Bayesian theory},
  author={Allan Birnbaum},
  • A. Birnbaum
  • Published 1 September 1977
  • Computer Science
  • Synthese
The concept of a decision, which is basic in the theories of Neyman Pearson, Wald, and Savage, has been judged obscure or inappropriate when applied to interpretations of data in scientific research, by Fisher, Cox, Tukey, and other writers. This point is basic for most statistical practice, which is based on applications of methods derived in the Neyman-Pearson theory or analogous applications of such methods as least squares and maximum likelihood. Two contrasting interpretations of the… 

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