The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

  title={The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence},
  author={Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press},
  journal={International Security},
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable… 
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