The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

@article{Kumabe2008TheNN,
  title={The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games},
  author={M. Kumabe and H. Mihara},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2008},
  volume={31},
  pages={621-640}
}
  • M. Kumabe, H. Mihara
  • Published 2008
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Social Choice and Welfare
  • The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or… CONTINUE READING
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