The NCAA Cartel, Monopsonistic Restrictions, and Antitrust Policy

@article{Blair2017TheNC,
  title={The NCAA Cartel, Monopsonistic Restrictions, and Antitrust Policy},
  author={R. Blair and Joseph R. Whitman},
  journal={The Antitrust Bulletin},
  year={2017},
  volume={62},
  pages={14 - 3}
}
  • R. Blair, Joseph R. Whitman
  • Published 2017
  • Economics
  • The Antitrust Bulletin
  • NCAA members behave like a buyer cartel and use the bylaws of the NCAA to maintain their collusive agreement. We model the NCAA as a collusive monopsony and demonstrate the impact on compensation and employment for student athletes, as well as the consequences for social welfare and distribution of surplus. Then we identify specific NCAA bylaws that restrain competition among cartel members, such as limits on the number of athletic scholarships awarded, recruiting, player transfers, and… CONTINUE READING

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