The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam

  title={The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam},
  author={Jonathan D. Caverley},
  journal={International Security},
A capital- and firepower-intensive military doctrine is, in general, poorly suited for combating an insurgency. It is therefore puzzling that democracies, particularly the United States, tenaciously pursue such a suboptimal strategy over long periods of time and in successive conflicts. This tendency poses an empirical challenge to the argument that democracies tend to win the conflicts they enter. This apparently nonstrategic behavior results from a condition of moral hazard owing to the… 
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