The Myth of Conventional Implicature

  title={The Myth of Conventional Implicature},
  author={Kent Bach},
  journal={Linguistics and Philosophy},
  • K. Bach
  • Published 1 August 1999
  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Philosophy
Depuis la distinction que fit Grice entre le dit et l'implicature, on considere generalement que le premier est du ressort de la semantique, tandis que le second appartient au domaine de la pragmatique. Cependant, dans cette distinction, l'implicature conventionnelle pose probleme, derivant plutot du sens d'expressions particulieres que des circonstances conversationnelles. L'A. veut demontrer la non-existence des implicatures conventionnelles 
Modality and what is said
Au-dela des concepts philosophiques de possibilite et necessite, l'A. determine le statut modal d'une proposition en analysant le contenu exprime par la phrase. Examinant la notion d'item lexical,Expand
Slurs in speech and thought
Cette these s'interesse a la structure, aux fonctions, et aux bases cognitives des termes d'offense (tels que le terme "boche"). Les termes d'offense, ainsi que leurs equivalents psychologiques,Expand
Implicature Revisited : Problems and Prospects in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics
Over 40 years ago Paul Grice inaugurated modern pragmatics by distinguishing what is implicated from what is said within a general theory of cooperation and rationality. While since challenged, theExpand
Into the Conventional‐Implicature Dimension
Grice coined the term ‘conventional implicature’ in a short passage in ‘Logic and conversation’. The description is intuitive and deeply intriguing. The range of phenomena that have since beenExpand
Review of The Logic of Conventional Implicatures by Chris Potts
We review Potts’ influential book on the semantics of conventional implicature (CI), offering an explication of his technical apparatus and drawing out the proposal’s implications, focusing on theExpand
Explicit performatives revisited
Abstract The paper defends a version of a traditional account of explicit performatives, according to which they are a kind of self-verifying indirect speech act, from recent arguments by Jary andExpand
Craige Roberts
The meaning of the English adverb only has been the subject of intense debate; in particular, regarding the status of its prejacent. It has been argued that the latter is a presupposition, aExpand
The Myth of Epistemic Implicata
Quite a few scholars claim that many implicata are propositions about the speaker’s epistemic or doxastic states. I argue, on the contrary, that implicata are generally non-epistemic. Some allegedExpand
Varieties of Conventional Implicature : Evidence from Japanese ∗
This paper examines the linguistic realization of conventi onal implicatures, taking the semantics and pragmatics of the Japanes e adverbials sekkakuandyokumoas a test case. It is shown that theirExpand
Implicatures and Naturalness
To answer the question of whether the typology of implicatures corresponds to an independent reality, the conceptual spaces framework is relied on, which represents concepts geometrically, and which provides a formally precise criterion for naturalness. Expand


Conventional Implicatures as Tacit Performatives
L'A. analyse les connecteurs discursifs tels que but, moreover et so, ainsi que certains modificateurs tels que even et still. A la difference de l'implicature conversationnelle, la contribution deExpand
Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates
Les propositions sont souvent caracterisees comme des entites jouant certains roles en philosophie du langage et en metaphysique. L'A. propose une perspective expliquant ce que sont les propositionsExpand
How performatives really work: A reply to searle
One way to do things with words is to do them explicitly. As J. L. Austin observed, one can do this by using "special explicit performative verbs like 'promise', 'pronounce', 'find', etc." inExpand
Even: The conventional implicature approach reconsidered
ConclusionLike Bennett's account of ‘even’, my analysis incorporates the following plausible and widespread intuitions. (a) The word ‘even’ does not make a truth-functional difference; it makes aExpand
Linguistic form and relevance
© Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber 2012. Introduction Our book Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986a) treats utterance interpretation as a two-phase process: a modular decoding phase is seen as providingExpand
Paul Grice and the philosophy of language
ing away from certain details that I will get to later, the direction of analysis for Grice is as follows, 43 It could be argued that one of the lessons of twentieth-century philosophy is thatExpand
Studies in the Way of Words.
This volume, Grice's first hook, includes the long-delayed publication of his enormously influential 1967 William James Lectures. But there is much, much more in this work. Paul Grice himself hasExpand
Varieties of quotation
It is shown that the leading theories of pure, direct, and indirect quotation are unable to account for mixed quotation and therefore unable to provide a unified theory, and develops a unified theories of quotation based on Davidson’s demonstrative theory. Expand
Non-sentential assertions and semantic ellipsis
The restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis is committed to an enormous number of multiply ambiguous expressions, the introduction of which gains us no extra explanatory power and the doctrine must be rejected. Expand
The difference between English restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses
A nonrestrictive relative clause (henceforth NRR) is shown in (I) and a restrictive relative clause (henceforth RR) in (2). (1) The swans, which are white, are in that part of the lake. (2) The swansExpand