The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare

  title={The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare},
  author={Daryl G. Press},
  journal={International Security},
  • Daryl G. Press
  • Published 1 October 2001
  • Political Science
  • International Security
On February 24, 1991, U.S. ground troops, supported by British, French, and Arab forces, moved north from Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi military. Four days later the job was apparently done: The Kuwaiti oag once again oew over Kuwait City, and what remained of the Iraqi military was in full retreat. Astonishingly, only sixty-three Americans were killed in a ground operation that most analysts expected would cause thousands of U.S. casualties. How did the coalition’s… 
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