The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism

@article{Sober1999TheMR,
  title={The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism},
  author={E. Sober},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={1999},
  volume={66},
  pages={542 - 564}
}
  • E. Sober
  • Published 1999
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's… Expand
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