The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game

  title={The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game},
  author={Enric Boix-Adser{\`a} and Benjamin L. Edelman and Siddhartha V. Jayanti},
  journal={Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
We initiate the study of the natural multiplayer generalization of the classic continuous Colonel Blotto game.The two-player Blotto game, introduced by Borel as a model of resource competition across nsimultaneous fronts, has been studied extensively for a century and seen numerous applications throughout the social sciences. Our work defines the multiplayer Colonel Blotto gameand derives Nash equilibria for various settings of k(number of players) and n(number of battlefields)---in particular… 
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Comments on Quantization and experimental realization of the Colonel Blotto game
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  • 2020
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The heterogeneous Colonel Blotto game
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  • Computer Science, Engineering
    2014 7th International Conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization (NetGCoop)
  • 2014
This paper proposes a solution of the heterogeneous Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric players and heterogeneous battlefield values, under the assumption that there is a sufficient number of battlefields of each possible value relative to the players' resources asymmetry.
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