The Moulin–Shenker rule

@article{Koster2007TheMR,
  title={The Moulin–Shenker rule},
  author={Maurice Koster},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2007},
  volume={29},
  pages={271-293}
}
  • Maurice Koster
  • Published 25 July 2007
  • Mathematics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
The Moulin–Shenker rule is a non-linear solution concept for solving heterogeneous cost sharing problems. It is the unique continuous rule with the properties scale invariance, bounds on cost shares and self-consistency. 
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References

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TLDR
The directional serial rule is introduced as a natural serial extension, generalizing the Moulin–Shenker cost sharing rule to heterogeneous cost sharing models and shows the incompatibility of the serial principle with differentiability of a cost sharingRule as a function of the individual demands.
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Abstract Cost sharing rules can be obtained by considering solution concepts on the associated cost games. The Shapley rule, nucleolus rule, and antinucleolus rule commonly satisfy “covariance under
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