The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group

@article{Dothan2018TheMO,
  title={The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group},
  author={Shai Dothan},
  journal={German Law Journal},
  year={2018},
  volume={19},
  pages={2165 - 2188}
}
Abstract States have a significant influence on the selection of judges to international courts. This raises the concern that judges will be biased in favor of their home states, a concern backed by some empirical research. To counter that danger, international courts usually sit in large and diverse panels. Scholars have argued that this gives judges only rare occasions to tip the balance in favor of their home states. The problem begins, however, when judges start forming coalitions among… 
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