The Moral Status of Cognitively Enhanced Monkeys and Other Novel Beings

  title={The Moral Status of Cognitively Enhanced Monkeys and Other Novel Beings},
  author={Gardar Arnason},
  journal={Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics},
  pages={492 - 503}
  • G. Arnason
  • Published 10 June 2021
  • Biology
  • Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Abstract The discussion about the moral status of novel beings tends to focus on artificial intelligence, robots, and other man-made systems. We should, however, also consider a likelier kind of novel beings: animals that are genetically modified to develop human-like cognitive capabilities. This paper focuses on the possibility of conferring human characteristics on nonhuman primates (NHPs) in the context of neuroscientific research. It first discusses the use of NHPs for neuroscientific… 
2 Citations

CQH_2000104 492..503

The implications for the moral status of cognitively enhanced NHPs, as well as the implications for other novel beings, are discussed.

Asking the Right Questions about Research with Nonhuman Primates

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  • 1999
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    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
  • 2019
The somewhat superannuated "problem of other minds" has unexpectedly risen from the dead, and, in its current incarnation, concerns the mental states of those who never lived.

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