The Moral Objection to Modal Realism

@article{Fischer2017TheMO,
  title={The Moral Objection to Modal Realism},
  author={Bob Fischer},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={2017},
  volume={82},
  pages={1015-1030}
}
  • Bob Fischer
  • Published 1 October 2017
  • Philosophy
  • Erkenntnis
If David Lewis’s modal realism (MR) is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes MR to imply that “there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them.” But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn’t be troubled by this objection: it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis… 
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