The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense

@article{Bolinger2020TheMG,
  title={The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense},
  author={Ren{\'e}e Jorgensen Bolinger},
  journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year={2020}
}
Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents’ entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can take. 
1 Citations

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 47 REFERENCES
I—Rights against Harm
A Practical Account of Self-Defence
Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic
Justifying Self-Defense
THE BLUFF: THE POWER OF INSINCERE ACTIONS
Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing
KILLING IN SELF-DEFENSE
Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law
Killing the Innocent in Self‐Defense
...
1
2
3
4
5
...