The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science

  title={The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science},
  author={Steven French},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={248 - 265}
  • S. French
  • Published 1 June 1990
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of partial structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both "iconic" and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself. 

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