The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence

@inproceedings{Ruback1983TheMF,
  title={The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence},
  author={Richard S. Ruback and Michael C. Jensen},
  year={1983}
}
  • Richard S. Ruback, Michael C. Jensen
  • Published 1983
  • Business
  • This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. With the exception of actions that exclude potential bidders, it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm… CONTINUE READING
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