The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980

@article{Jarrell1988TheMF,
  title={The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980},
  author={Gregg A. Jarrell and James A. Brickley and Jeffry Netter},
  journal={Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  year={1988},
  volume={2},
  pages={49-68}
}
C orporate takeovers have been very big business in the 1980s. The Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) of the Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that shareholders of target firms in successful tender offers from 1981 through 1986 received payments in excess of $54 billion over the value of their holdings before the tender offers. Almost $38 billion of the total was received after 1984. If we include the increased wealth of target firm shareholders resulting from leveraged buyouts… 

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