The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm

  title={The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm},
  author={Karl Hack},
  journal={Journal of Strategic Studies},
  pages={383 - 414}
  • K. Hack
  • Published 2009
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Strategic Studies
Abstract The Malayan Emergency of 1948–60 has been repeatedly cited as a source of counter-insurgency lessons, with debate over the relative importance of coercion, ‘winning hearts and minds’, and achieving unified and dynamic control. This paper argues that all these techniques and more were important, but that their weight varied dramatically across quite distinct campaign phases. The conclusions include that effective counter-insurgency analysis must integrate cognition of such phases (there… Expand
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