Corpus ID: 14914215

The Majority Judgment Voting Procedure: A Critical Evaluation 1

  title={The Majority Judgment Voting Procedure: A Critical Evaluation 1},
  author={Dan S. Felsenthal and Mosh{\'e} Machover},
We evaluate critically some of the properties of the Majority Judgement voting procedure recently proposed by Balinski and Laraki for the election of one out of two or more candidates. 
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