The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization

  title={The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization},
  author={Michael J. Hiscox},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={669 - 698}
  • M. Hiscox
  • Published 1 September 1999
  • Economics
  • International Organization
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences: namely, by changing the trade policymaking process in the United States, the RTAA is held responsible for the dramatic liberalization in U.S. policy beginning in the 1930s and 1940s. This article takes issue with this conventional wisdom. I argue that the standard accounts—which emphasize the importance of delegation for overcoming logrolling in Congress or… 

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