The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969

  title={The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969},
  author={Scott Douglas Sagan and Jeremi Suri},
  journal={International Security},
  • S. Sagan, J. Suri
  • Published 16 June 2003
  • Political Science
  • International Security
On the evening of October 10, 1969, Gen. Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), sent a top secret message to major U.S. military commanders around the world informing them that the JCS had been directed “by higher authority” to increase U.S. military readiness “to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union.” The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was ordered to stand down all aircraft combat training missions and to increase the number of nucleararmed B-52 bombers… 
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