The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO's Victory in Kosovo Revisited

@article{Lake2009TheLO,
  title={The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO's Victory in Kosovo Revisited},
  author={Daniel R. Lake},
  journal={International Security},
  year={2009},
  volume={34},
  pages={83-112}
}
  • Daniel R. Lake
  • Published 7 July 2009
  • Political Science
  • International Security
Many studies of the 1999 Kosovo crisis argue that although airpower played an important role in forcing President Slobodan Miloevi's capitulation, NATO's threat of a ground invasion was critical. Other studies claim that no such threat existed or that it was irrelevant to ending the crisis. Instead, they attribute NATO's success solely to the strategic use of coercive airpower. There is, however, another explanation: the rising dissatisfaction with Miloevi's rule among his supporters as the… 

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