The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality

@article{Woodling2016TheLO,
  title={The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality},
  author={Casey Woodling},
  journal={Inquiry},
  year={2016},
  volume={59},
  pages={488 - 512}
}
Abstract Kriegel has recently developed (but not fully endorsed) an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails… 

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