The Leader Rule

  title={The Leader Rule},
  author={Jean-François Laslier},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={113 - 136}
The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected. 
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