The Last Mathematician from Hilbert's Göttingen: Saunders Mac Lane as Philosopher of Mathematics

@article{McLarty2007TheLM,
  title={The Last Mathematician from Hilbert's G{\"o}ttingen: Saunders Mac Lane as Philosopher of Mathematics},
  author={Colin McLarty},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  year={2007},
  volume={58},
  pages={77 - 112}
}
  • C. McLarty
  • Published 1 March 2007
  • Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
While Saunders Mac Lane studied for his D.Phil in Göttingen, he heard David Hilbert's weekly lectures on philosophy, talked philosophy with Hermann Weyl, and studied it with Moritz Geiger. Their philosophies and Emmy Noether's algebra all influenced his conception of category theory, which has become the working structure theory of mathematics. His practice has constantly affirmed that a proper large-scale organization for mathematics is the most efficient path to valuable specific results… 
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Recent publications
I was a Lecturer, Reader, and then Professor, at Bristol from 1985 to 2001. I moved to University of Warwick, and retired in 2014, returning to Bristol. In addition to my position here, I retain
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