The Justification of Bicameralism

  title={The Justification of Bicameralism},
  author={W. Riker},
  journal={International Political Science Review},
  pages={101 - 116}
  • W. Riker
  • Published 1992
  • Economics
  • International Political Science Review
The main disadvantage of unicameral legislatures operating by simple majority rule is that, when politics is two-dimensional, they allow the adoption of out-of-equilibrium policies. Since in such cases a majority opposed to what a majority has adopted, the result is majority tyranny. To minimize such tyranny, it is necessary to delay action until a true majority in society is arrived at. Of the several methods of delay — supermajorityism, multipartyism, multicameralism — the best is… Expand

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