The Inverse Problem of Linear-Quadratic Differential Games: When is a Control Strategies Profile Nash?

  title={The Inverse Problem of Linear-Quadratic Differential Games: When is a Control Strategies Profile Nash?},
  author={Yunhan Huang and Tao Zhang and Quanyan Zhu},
  journal={2022 58th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)},
This paper aims to formulate and study the inverse problem of non-cooperative linear quadratic games: Given a profile of control strategies, find cost parameters for which this profile of control strategies is Nash. We formulate the problem as a leader-followers problem, where a leader aims to implant a desired profile of control strategies among selfish players. In this paper, we leverage frequency-domain techniques to develop a necessary and sufficient condition on the existence of cost… 
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