• Corpus ID: 154647227

The Interdependent Nature of National Cyber Security: Motivating Private Action for a Public Good

  title={The Interdependent Nature of National Cyber Security: Motivating Private Action for a Public Good},
  author={Forrest Hare},
The Interdependent Nature of National Cyber Security: Motivating Private Action for a Public Good Forrest Hare, Ph.D. George Mason University, 2010 Dissertation Director: Dr. Rainer Sommer The federal government relies largely on voluntary actions by the private firms that comprise the nation’s critical infrastructure to secure their operations. Several recent reports have highlighted the potential for cyber security externalities if IT and control systems are not more sufficiently secured… 
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