The Intentional Stance.

  title={The Intentional Stance.},
  author={Daniel C. Dennett},
How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand… 
To Adopt the Intentional Stance
We begin our commentary with a bit of common-sense or everyday psychology, because intention is a notion that originates in our everyday understanding of human action. This introductory analysis
Précis of The Intentional Stance
  • D. Dennett
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1988
Abstract The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other “intentional” states to systems – living and nonliving – and predicts future
Narrative Theory and the Intentional Stance
Drawing on treatments of the problem of intentionality in fields encompassed by the umbrella discipline of cognitive science, including language theory, psychology, and the philosophy of mind, this
The Intentional Stance and Cultural Learning: A Developmental Feedback Loop
In this paper, I propose a developmental explanation of the reliability of the intentional stance as an interpretive strategy, and by doing so counter an objection to Dennett’s intentional stance
Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age
Memory and the Intentional Stance
There are many topics one can’t help but associate with the Daniel Dennett: consciousness, free-will, evolution, intentionality, religion. But in discussions of memory, his name may not come up as
Intentionality, mind and folk psychology
The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from
Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance
I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition
Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality
Abstract In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most


Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content
'Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?' 'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.' 'The dog did nothing in the night-time.' 'That was the curious
From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief.
The average person has a rich belief system about the thoughts and motives of people. From antiquity to the beginning of this century, Stephen Stich points out, this "folk psychology" was employed in
Thinking of Individuals
1. A good deal of our conversations, and, no doubt, of our thinking, is about individuals. As we often talk about Gerald Ford, the moon, the City of New York, and so forth, we frequently think about
Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother
Freedom of the individual
Stuart Hampshire's essay on human freedom offers an important analysis of concepts surrounding the central idea of intentional action. The author contrasts the powers of animals and of inanimate
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
  • J. Fodor
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1980
Abstract The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the
The view from nowhere
Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage
Word and Object
This edition offers a new preface by Quine's student and colleague Dagfinn Follesdal that describes the never-realized plans for a second edition of Word and Object, in which Quine would offer a more unified treatment of the public nature of meaning, modalities, and propositional attitudes.
Brain Writing and Mind Reading
What are we to make of the popular notion that our brains are somehow libraries of our thoughts and beliefs? Is it in principle possible that brain scientists might one day know enough about the