The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality

@article{Grossman1981TheIR,
  title={The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality},
  author={Sanford J. Grossman},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  year={1981},
  volume={24},
  pages={461 - 483}
}
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality Author(s): Sanford J. Grossman Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, Consumer Protection Regulation: A Conference Sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State (Dec., 1981), pp. 461-483 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/725273 Accessed: 27/08/2008 20:18 

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