The Individuation of Tropes

  title={The Individuation of Tropes},
  author={Jonathan Schaffer},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={247 - 257}
  • J. Schaffer
  • Published 1 June 2001
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
A trope is a particular property: the redness of a rose, the roundness of the moon. It is generally supposed that tropes are individuated by primitive quantity: this redness, that roundness. I argue that the trope theorist is far better served by individuating tropes by spatiotemporal relation: here redness, there roundness. In short, tropes are not this-suches but here-suches. I generally favour an ontology, much like that of David Hume and very much like that of D. C. Williams, on which… 
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