The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations

  title={The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations},
  author={Steffen Huck and Joerg Oechssler},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the assumption that players behave rationally for given preferences but that their preferences change through an evolutionary process. We prove that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing… 
Random allocation of pies promotes the evolution of fairness in the Ultimatum Game
Interestingly, it is found that the evolution of fairness can be promoted by the randomness associated with the size of pies, without the support of any additional evolutionary mechanisms.
The Evolution of Fair Offers with Low Rejection Thresholds in the Ultimatum Game
An agent-based model is developed to investigate how generous strategies could evolve in the ultimatum game and finds that fair offers can readily evolve in structured populations even while rejection thresholds remain relatively low.
Rational Constraints and the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game
The work described here simulated a series of Ultimatum Games, in which populations of agents earned resources based on their preferences for proposing and accepting (or rejecting) offers of various sizes, and saw populations without the ordinal constraint come to emulate maximizing economic agents, while populations with the constraint came to resemble the behavior of human players.
Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game
Using stochastic evolutionary game theory, where agents make mistakes when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, natural selection favors fairness, and across a range of parameters, the average strategy matches the observed behavior.
Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the Art
In the basic ultimatum bargaining game two players, P1 and P2, must divide a pie ( ). P1 proposes a division in which he gets x and P2 gets x. P2 can then accept the division, in which the is split
A New Solution Concept for the Ultimatum Game leading to the Golden Ratio
The optimality principle is explained both in an axiomatic way and by bargaining arguments, and the relation to Fibonacci numbers is outlined.
The evolutionary origins of human fairness
Humans care about fairness and are ready to suffer financial losses for the sake of it. The existence of such costly preferences for fairness constitutes an evolutionary puzzle. Recently, some


Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Abstract We present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers′ willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games. We examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Abstract Previous investigations have shown that laboratory play of the ultimatum game differs from the perfect equilibrium prediction. The anonymity hypothesis attributes this to a distortion of
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
We evaluate two competing hypotheses that try to account for robust violations of the predictions of game theory in Ultimatum bargaining experiments. One popular hypothesis is that the subjects are
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
Laboratory data from bargaining experiments have started a debate about the prospects for various parts of game theory as descriptive theories of observable behavior, and about whether, to what
An evolutionary approach to norms
Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of
A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence
Recent laboratory studies of alternating-offer bargaining find many empirical regularities that are inconsistent with the standard theory. In this paper, the author postulates that bargainers behave
Evolutionary games are introduced as models for repeated anonymous strategic interaction: actions (or behaviors) which are more "fit," given the current distribution of behaviors, tend over time to