The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations

  title={The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations},
  author={Steffen Huck and Joerg Oechssler},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the assumption that players behave rationally for given preferences but that their preferences change through an evolutionary process. We prove that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing… 

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  • R. Axelrod
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 1986
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