The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization

@inproceedings{Chang2008TheIO,
  title={The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization},
  author={Myong-Hun Chang and Joseph E. Harrington},
  year={2008}
}
To explore the e¢ cacy of a corporate leniency program, a Markov process is constructed which models the stochastic formation and demise of cartels. Cartels are born when given the opportunity and market conditions are right; while cartels die because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority. The likelihood that a cartel, once identi…ed, is convicted inversely depends on the caseload of the antitrust authority due to a resource constraint. The authority… CONTINUE READING

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