• Corpus ID: 41000386

The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Policies in U . S . Cities ∗

@inproceedings{Sieg2012TheIO,
  title={The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Policies in U . S . Cities ∗},
  author={Holger Sieg},
  year={2012}
}
The efficient decentralized provision of public goods requires that special interest groups, such as municipal unions, do not exercise undue influence on the outcome of municipal elections and local fiscal policies. We develop a new political economy model in which two politicians face each other in a local election. A union can endorse one of the candidates and thus influence the outcome of an election. One key finding of the theoretical analysis highlights the inherent conflict faced by the… 

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