• Corpus ID: 142411508

The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science

  title={The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science},
  author={Gary J. Miller},
  journal={Journal of Economic Literature},
  • G. Miller
  • Published 1997
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Economic Literature
Early economic models assumed that the maximizing behavior of individual actors was the primary determinant of political as well as market outcomes. This approach revolved several long-standing puzzles in political science, but created new anomalies in place of the old: why do citizens vote in large elections? Why are democratic legislatures as stable as they are? Partly in response to these anomalies, the emphasis has shifted from the study of self-interested choice, to the study of… 

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