The Illusion of Conscious Will

@inproceedings{Wegner2002TheIO,
  title={The Illusion of Conscious Will},
  author={Daniel M. Wegner},
  year={2002}
}
Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious… 
When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will
In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that
Précis of The illusion of conscious will
  • D. Wegner
  • Medicine, Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 2004
TLDR
This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation, according to which when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, the authors experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action.
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  • Psychology, Medicine
    International journal of law and psychiatry
  • 2004
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In this section, this article surveys some of the more notable disturbances of the will, the better to establish its existence, and begin to appreciate its role in human action.
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HOW TO ACCEPT WEGNER'S ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL AND STILL DEFEND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
In The Illusion of Conscious Will, Daniel Wegner (2002) argues that our commonsense belief that our conscious choices cause our voluntary actions is mistaken. Wegner cites experimental results that
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References

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Précis of The illusion of conscious will
  • D. Wegner
  • Medicine, Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 2004
TLDR
This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation, according to which when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, the authors experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action.
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We should all agree that the brain and the mind are intimately linked. One need only drink some wine to remind one of the physicochemical controls of mental function, acting via the brain. And one
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Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? behavioral & brain sciences
An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly
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We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things. Our commonsense psychology uses the notion of intention to characterize both our actions and our mental states: I might intentionally start my
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