The Identity of Indiscernibles

@article{Ayer1954TheIO,
  title={The Identity of Indiscernibles},
  author={Alfred Jules Ayer},
  journal={Analysis},
  year={1954},
  volume={14},
  pages={103-110}
}
  • A. Ayer
  • Published 1 March 1954
  • Philosophy
  • Analysis
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles would seem, in the forms in which it is usually stated, to be at best contingently true. It does not appear that even Leibniz held it to be logically inconceivable that different things should have all their properties in common. That ‘no substances are completely similar, or differ solo numero’1 was established, in his view, by the principle of sufficient reason, but he conceded that ‘the supposition of two indiscernibles seems to be possible in… 
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