The Harsanyi paradox and the "right to talk" in bargaining among coalitions

@article{VidalPuga2012TheHP,
  title={The Harsanyi paradox and the "right to talk" in bargaining among coalitions},
  author={Juan J. Vidal-Puga},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year={2012},
  volume={64},
  pages={214-224}
}
I describe a new coalitional value from a non-cooperative point of view, assuming coalitions are formed for the purpose of bargaining. The idea is that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own “right to talk” when joining a coalition. The resulting value coincides with the weighted Shapley value in the game between coalitions, with weights given by the size of the coalitions. I apply this value to an intriguing example presented by… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 21 references

An implementation of the Owen value, Games and Economic Behavior

  • Vidal-Puga J.J, G. Bergantiños
  • 2003

Bargaining and value

  • E Kalai
  • Econometrica
  • 1996

The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

  • E Calvo, J. Lasaga, E. Winter
  • Mathematical Social Sciences
  • 1996
2 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…