The Harder Problem of Consciousness

  title={The Harder Problem of Consciousness},
  author={Ned Block},
  journal={The Journal of Philosophy},
  • N. Block
  • Published 1 August 2002
  • Philosophy
  • The Journal of Philosophy
The aim of this paper is to present another problem of consciousness. The Harder Problem as I will call it is more epistemological than the Hard Problem. A second difference: the Hard Problem could arise for someone who has no conception of another person, whereas the Harder Problem is tied closely to the problem of other minds. Finally, the Harder Problem reveals an epistemic tension or at least discomfort in our ordinary conception of consciousness that is not suggested by the Hard Problem… 

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Curse of the Qualia Reprinted in Block, Flanagan & Güzeldere, op.cit. The DNA issue is also mentioned in the version of Shoemaker's " The Inverted Spectrum
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