The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

@article{Solms2019TheHP,
  title={The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle},
  author={Mark Solms},
  journal={Frontiers in Psychology},
  year={2019},
  volume={9}
}
  • M. Solms
  • Published 30 January 2019
  • Philosophy
  • Frontiers in Psychology
This article applies the free energy principle to the hard problem of consciousness. After clarifying some philosophical issues concerning functionalism, it identifies the elemental form of consciousness as affect and locates its physiological mechanism (an extended form of homeostasis) in the upper brainstem. This mechanism is then formalized in terms of free energy minimization (in unpredicted contexts) where decreases and increases in expected uncertainty are felt as pleasure and unpleasure… 

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