The Generality Problem for Reliabilism

@article{Conee1998TheGP,
  title={The Generality Problem for Reliabilism},
  author={Earl Conee and Richard Feldman},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={1998},
  volume={89},
  pages={1-29}
}
Etude des differentes solutions apportees au probleme de la generalite qui se pose au theories de la justification des croyances vraies fondees sur la fiabilite des processus. Examinant les types de processus relevant du sens commun (A. Goldman), de la science (W. Alston, R. Baergen) et des contextes, tels que les especes naturelles, le realisme psychologique, la specificite maximale et la causalite etroite, l'A. examine les reponses particulieres apportees par F. Schmitt et M. Heller a partir… 

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