The Game of Belief Final Version as Submitted 14 June 2019
@inproceedings{Maguire2019TheGO,
title={The Game of Belief Final Version as Submitted 14 June 2019},
author={B. Maguire and J. Woods and D. Baker and R. Basu and Selim Berker and D. Bradley and Michael E Bratman and Chris Cowie and Jorah Dannenberg and Edward Elliot and M. Eklund and Chris Howard and Nadeem J. Z. Hussain and Jessica Isserow and J. Keiser and Benjamin Kiesewetter and Matthew Kotzen and K. Lawlor and Taylor Madigan and Meghan Maguire and S. Mantel and M. Mosse and Austen McDougal and Erum Naqvi and R. Neta and D. Plunkett and Andrew Reisner and Susanna Rinard and K. Ritchie and L{\'e}a Salje and Geoffrey Sayre-Mccord and Karl Schafer},
year={2019}
}It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, we draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normativity. The account relies upon a further distinction… Expand
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