The Further Evolution of Cooperation

  title={The Further Evolution of Cooperation},
  author={Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion},
  pages={1385 - 1390}
Axelrod's model of the evolution of cooperation was based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Empirical work following this approach has helped establish the prevalence of cooperation based on reciprocity. Theoretical work has led to a deeper understanding of the role of other factors in the evolution of cooperation: the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure. 
The evolution of degrees of cooperation.
The Prisoner's Dilemma has been widely studied as a model for the evolution of cooperation, yet there are important differences between this case and that of "all or nothing" cooperation.
The Evolution of Degrees of Cooperation
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been widely studied as a model for the evolution of cooperation, and most of this work has dealt with agents who either cooperate or not. In this paper we look at the
The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process
In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game
Twenty Years on: The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited
His and subsequent work provide a valuable general framework for the analysis of the conditions promoting cooperative play, and this literature makes important methodological innovations through the evolutionary analysis of boundedly-rational interaction and learning using computer simulations.
Evolution of Cooperation in N-player Social Dilemmas: The Importance of being Mobile
This paper presents results that compare the outcomes using the classical two player prisoner's dilemma and a generalised N-player prisoner’s dilemma, and explores the effect that agent density has on the evolution of cooperation in the environment.
The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited
Robert Axelrod's seminal round-robin computer tournaments for the repeated prisoner's dilemma have been hailed as the explanation of the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, Axelrod's results are
Cooperation in heterogeneous populations
Both the analysis of monomorphic and heteromorphic populations show that the reciprocal strategy Tit For Tat acts like a pivot: it triggers an evolution towards cooperation, but is not the ultimate beneficiary of such an evolution.
The impact of noise on iterated prisoner's dilemma with multiple levels of cooperation
  • S. Y. Chong, X. Yao
  • Physics
    Proceedings of the 2004 Congress on Evolutionary Computation (IEEE Cat. No.04TH8753)
  • 2004
It is shown that noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation, but could improve, surprisingly, the evolutionary stability.


The evolution of cooperation.
A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
It is argued that no pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, which casts doubt on several of Axelrod's conclusions about the evolution of reciprocity.
Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games
Axelrod has developed an evolutionary approach to the study of repeated games and applied that approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma. We apply this approach, with some modifications in the treatment of
Optimal Retaliation for Optimal Cooperation
There has been a growing number of theoretical as well as experimental investigations on the emergence of evolutionarily stable cooperative strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. From a
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
  • R. Axelrod
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 1981
This article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority. This problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political
A Formal Analysis of the Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract : We examine a formal model of the way a growing population selects behavior. The members of the population engage in randomly-selected binary interactions, with payoffs representing a
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
The tit-for-tat strategy in iterated prisoners' dilemma games is examined in the presence of disturbances. It is shown that performance deteriorates drastically at arbitrarily low noise levels. The
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among