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Corpus ID: 226236782

The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics

@article{Wiese2020TheFO,
title={The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics},
author={Samuel C. Wiese and T. Heinrich},
journal={arXiv: Theoretical Economics},
year={2020}
}

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must converge to the Nash equilibrium. We then consider a wider class of games that converge under a best-response dynamic, in which each player chooses their optimal pure strategy successively. We show that the frequency of convergent games goes to zero as the numberâ€¦Â Expand