The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships

  title={The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships},
  author={Carles Boix and Milan W. Svolik},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
Why do some dictatorships establish institutions that may constrain their leaders? We argue that institutions promote the survival of dictatorships by facilitating authoritarian power-sharing. Specifically, institutions such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils alleviate commitment and monitoring problems between the dictator and his allies caused by the secrecy in authoritarian governance. However, because authoritarian power-sharing succeeds only when it is backed by a credible… 

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