The Foundational Cryptography Framework

@article{Petcher2015TheFC,
  title={The Foundational Cryptography Framework},
  author={Adam Petcher and J. Gregory Morrisett},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2015},
  volume={abs/1410.3735}
}
We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework FCF for developing and checking complete proofs of security for cryptographic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose framework that is capable of modeling and reasoning about a wide range of cryptographic schemes, security definitions, and assumptions. Security is proven in the computational model, and the proof provides concrete bounds as well as asymptotic conclusions. FCF provides a language for probabilistic programs, a… Expand
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