The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts

  title={The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts},
  author={Shaun Nichols},
  journal={Mind \& Language},
According to agent-causal accounts of free will, agents have the capacity to cause actions, and for a given action, an agent could have done otherwise. This paper uses existing results and presents experimental evidence to argue that young children deploy a notion of agent-causation. If young children do have such a notion, however, it remains quite unclear how they acquire it. Several possible acquisition stories are canvassed, including the possibility that the notion of agent-causation… Expand

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